

del entender» (*Discreto* 49). In Calderón's staging of this aesthetic, we see a highly modern technique that meshes theory and practice, philosophy and literature, in a theater that offers the varied audience true participation in the complex process of communal creation and interpretation.

The problem of the limitation of human knowledge that confuses so many philosophical characters on Calderón's stage was a prime concern to Gracián, who glosses the inscription on the portico of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, *gnothi sauton* (know theyself), as «Conocerse y aplicarse,» and he guides the reader along the right road: «Comience por sí mismo el Discreto a saber, sabiéndose» (*Discreto* 51). Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, in his magnificent five-volume study titled *Theo-Drama*, has commented on this famous Greek phrase: «In its original meaning, the Delphic Oracle contains an admonition to man to consider God and be aware of his human limitation. This is how the poetic and philosophical literature of Greece, right up to and including the stoics, interpreted the inscription» (487). In Calderón's *No hay más fortuna que Dios*, the personification of Bien, addressing Justicia, explains that his unveiling in the theater is a «visible means» for man to act correctly along his cognitive path:

Aunque noto
que intrínsecamente oculto
me traje siempre el embozo,
si para Gloria de Dios
hoy tu concepto ingenioso
me ha menester descubierto,
a servirte me dispongo. (621)

As he reflects upon the Eucharist in terms of salvation history, Calderón invents an «ingenious concept» that opens the way for the allegorical development of visible images or representations that act as signs along what St. Bonaventure called «the mind's road to God» (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum*). The method is almost identical to the one adopted by Gracián when he writes: «Comunícase el alma noblemente produciendo conceptuosas imágenes de sí en la mente del que oye, que es propiamente el conversar» (*Criticón* 69). The difference is that Calderón visualizes those «conceptual images» on the stages of his autos as if they were the very conceptual boards in the mind of his spectators. Here we see an enormous advancement in the dramatic art of Calderón, for he combines the exterior spaces of representation with the interior spaces of fantasy or imagination, as he stages characters who play with the multiple dimensions of thought while representing the very act of thinking.

In *El día mayor de los días*, Calderón repeats the rational limitations of Ingenio as understanding before questions of faith, by placing this character in a dialogue with the personification of Noche, who allegorizes his own Sin:

INGENIO ¿Quién eres
 tú para que me embaraces
 el paso?
NOCHE La Culpa soy,
 de tu ignorancia bastante
 rémora para que no
 oses ni verle ni hablarle.
INGENIO ¿Cuándo fueron del Ingenio
 Culpas las dificultades?
NOCHE Cuando tocaron en Fe. (1655)

The playwright casts the Ingenio toward that gnoseological admonition regarding God and human limitation, the *gnothi sauton* that only reveals all its ontological implications in the context of the dramatic tension between revelation and faith, which St. Paul called the «economy or fellowship of the mystery» (Ephesians 3.9), and which St. Jerome translated as *dispensatio sacramenti*. Ingenio approaches the personification of Tiempo—who actually represents eternity, rather than time—to help him resolve the confusing mix of Old and New Testaments that can only be comprehended through allegory, leaving behind the deductive procedure of reason, and relying on the inductive procedure of the mystical «experience,» the experience of faith: «a consultar tu experiencia / mi Pensamiento me traiga» (1639). Sacred history is incomprehensible to metaphysics, which is precisely the conflict that grounds the allegorical plot of this auto. Tiempo explains the exegetical process in light of the figurative plane, the allegorical praxis that synthesizes all times and all places, not within a causal process, but within an eternal, vertical time:

Aunque en ese literal
sentido la Historia Sacra
al Grano de aquesta Siembra
Grano de Trigo le llama,
no es por ser Grano de Trigo,
sino por hacer más clara
la Inteleigencia, poniendo
en la cosa más usada
el ejemplo; pues si de ese
literal sentido pasas
al alegórico y luego

el Espíritu levantas
 al Místico, hallarás que
 la Semilla de quien habla
 el Texto, no es la Semilla
 material, sino tan alta
 Divina Semilla, que es
 no menos que la Palabra
 de Dios. (1639)

Tiempo, as God's warden, becomes an ingenious stage director that depends on the didactic wit of the representational experience, and not on reason, to achieve his hermeneutical objective: «quizá te dirán más / sus señas que mis palabras» (1640). It is the power of the representational image and not rational discourse that reveals the mystery of Christ to the Ingenio and to the audience of Madrid. The rest of the *auto* consists of the mounting of scenes from sacred history—Adam, Moses, Emmanuel (Christ)—in the allegorical theater of Time (i.e., eternal present), where: «no hay tiempo para él pasado / ni futuro, de manera / que tiempo presente es todo» (1638).

Although the Ingenio is the protagonist of only a handful of *autos* and *loas*, the human faculty that he represents extends throughout Calderón's sacramental theater. In *A Dios por razón de Estado*, the Ingenio—allegorical personification of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, dressed as a Spanish gentleman of the seventeenth century—dialogues with his «loco» Pensamiento to attempt to decipher that inscription on the altar described in the book of Acts of the Apostles: «Ignoto Deo» (Acts 17.23). But the personification of Gentilidad responds opportunely: «que en materias de Fe, solo / toca callar al Ingenio» (854). Unlike Gracián's *ingenio*, the personification of Ingenio in Calderón sets out from reason, only to discover through his experiences the limitations of this and every other strictly human method. The intellectual failure leads him to embrace the analogies or correspondences rooted in faith. Hence, Calderón looks deeply into the *arte de ingenio*, amplifying the ontotheological backdrop of the human faculty. The playwright stages an allegorical debate between Gentilidad («Yo no he de creer que haya / Dios pasible») and Ingenio («Yo que haya ignorado Dios / tampoco creeré»), and between the two he places Pensamiento («Dando vueltas entre los dos»). Gentilidad and Ingenio comment on the fickleness of Pensamiento: «¡Oh cuál anda entre los dos / vacilando el Pensamiento!» (855-56). Such visualizations in the *autos* clearly take advantage of the kinetic energy of the theater to stage the thought process in a meaningful and relevant way for Calderón's diverse audience of nobles, theologians, and the illiterate masses. In the face of the offenses of the pagan gods, Ingenio considers that

en lo pecaminoso
 no es posible haber misterio
 que a la razón natural
 no repugne; pues más cierto
 es de un Dios, en los delitos,
 quitarlos que cometerlos. (857)

What follows is a list of gods and their transgressions, specifically concerning a factor that does not appear in Greek religion or mythology, namely, sin. Gentilidad, offended, attempts to drag Pensamiento with her, a dramatic moment in which Pensamiento emphasizes Calderón's own *ingenio* and *agudeza*:

GENTILIDAD	Ven, Pensamiento, conmigo; deja ese loco.
PENSAMIENTO	No puedo ir tras ti.
GENTILIDAD	¿Por qué?
PENSAMIENTO	Porque la agudeza soy del Ingenio; tras la natural razón me arrebató el Pensamiento. (857)

Here we see Pensamiento split into two simultaneous roles: that of Pensamiento, and that of Ingenio's *agudeza*. The Ingenio responds to Gentilidad's temptation by reeling in his Pensamiento, since he is needed in the task of discerning the issue of that unknown and passible god that is the object of his contemplation:

INGENIO	Ea, Pensamiento, vamos.
PENSAMIENTO	¿Dónde hemos de ir?
INGENIO	Trascendiendo (supuesto que no se da en lo alegórico tiempo ni lugar) todos los ritos, hasta que halle ley en ellos de un Dios que, ignoto y pasible, le cuadre a mi entendimiento. (857)

The playwright contextualizes his aesthetics within the sacramental theology that underlies his Eucharistic pieces. Throughout these plays, there is an insistence on the idea that thought, whether rational or *ingenioso*, cannot penetrate the mystery of Christ. For that, only a Christian thought, deeply rooted in faith and dialogue,

and actively engaged with the creative and cognitive dimensions of metaphor, will reveal the hidden truth.

Seventeenth-century Spanish art and thought center on a secular trinity of *concepto*, *agudeza*, and *ingenio*, and the role of Calderón on this stage of early modern metaphor theory cannot be overstated. The poet-playwright turned the theories of treatises and the static images of emblem books into living characters that acted out the very thought processes of their spectators in the act of thinking about the characters and actions they were watching. In so doing, the author gives us a new and unique perspective on the creative and cognitive operations of metaphor that blur the lines between literature and philosophy. A reassessment of Calderón's various personifications of the mind in the act of creating and discovering novel correspondences among seemingly disparate objects can certainly open new critical paths of inquiry into the theoretical, poetic, and emblematic works that exemplify the Spanish baroque and its legacy in postmodern metaphor theory. Perhaps of even greater interest to the reader/spectator, those personifications can offer profound insight into that age-old adage: «know thyself.» If Dante's *Purgatorio* is a «drama of the mind,» as Francis Fergusson has felicitously called it, then we can surely consider Calderón's *autos* under the rubric of «metadrama of the mind.»

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STAGES OF THINKING: CALDERÓN'S METADRAMA OF THE MIND "FOR HENRY W. SULLIVAN, ACTUS IN AMICITIA"

RESUMEN:

En conformidad con el *arte de ingenio* esbozado por Gracián desde la Antigüedad hasta su propia modernidad naciente, Calderón funde el acto de conocer con el de crear, destacando el *concepto ingenioso* como encuentro íntimo entre el artista y el público. El dramaturgo convirtió las teorías sobre el *ingenium* y las imágenes estáticas de los libros de emblemas en personajes vivos que representaban los mismos procesos de pensamiento de los espectadores en el acto de pensar en los personajes y las acciones que estaban viendo. De esta manera, Calderón nos brinda una perspectiva nueva y singular sobre las operaciones creativas y cognitivas de la metáfora que difuminan las líneas entre la literatura y la filosofía.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Pensamiento, cognición, agudeza, *ingenium*, emblema, metáfora, puesta en escena

ABSTRACT:

In accord with the *arte de ingenio* traced by Gracián from Antiquity to his own nascent modernity, Calderón fuses the act of knowing with that of creating, underscoring the *concepto ingenioso* as an intimate encounter between artist and spectator. The playwright turned the theories of *ingenium* and the static images of emblem books into living char-

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acters that acted out the very thought processes of the spectators in the act of thinking about the characters and actions they were watching. In so doing, Calderón gives us a new and unique perspective on the creative and cognitive operations of metaphor that blur the lines between literature and philosophy.

KEY WORDS: Thought, cognition, *agudeza*, *ingenium*, emblem, metaphor, staging

At the dawn of modern thought, when René Descartes would redefine the notion of knowledge and the path to certainty through methodic doubt,² Pedro Calderón de la Barca casts myriad characters onto the stage of Christian existence where they are obliged to seek certainty or truth. In the secular plays, Calderón's characters seek knowledge through science, logic, and reason, only to find themselves in the grasp of skepticism, or even probabilism.³ In the religious plays, particularly in the *autos sacramentales*, characters follow the dead-end paths of empiricism and rationalism, which cannot lead them to their goal of truth as *aletheia*.⁴ In the *autos*, the resolution of the basic conflict of the limitations of human intelligence in the face of the divine takes the form of allegories, in which the playwright frequently personifies Faith and Understanding to visualize the inherent struggle between rational comprehension and what Baltasar Gracián called «ponderación misteriosa.»⁵

In accord with the *arte de ingenio* traced by Gracián from Antiquity to his own nascent modernity, Calderón fuses the act of knowing with that of creating,

² Doubt as the starting point for an existential quest for truth or certainty can be traced from St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei*—«Si enim fallor, sum» (XI, 26; 345)—to Descartes's *Principia philosophiae*: «Cogito, ergo sum» (3-4); it may be noted that Descartes's famous *cogito* appeared seven years earlier in French—«Je pense donc je suis» (32)—in the author's *Discours de la méthode*, originally published in 1637. For an excellent study of Descartes's inheritance of Augustine's project, see Menn.

³ For two magnificent analyses of skepticism and probabilism in early modern Spain, see Sullivan, especially chapter 1 («The Cultural and Intellectual Background of Spain in the Counter Reformation»), and Regalado, who deals at length with Descartes and Calderón as two very different, yet often uncannily comparable, thinkers.

⁴ For a discussion on *aletheia* as truth in Calderón's *autos*, see Martin, especially chapter 3 («Con los ojos de la fe») (61-89).

⁵ «Consiste el artificio de esta especie de conceptos en levantar misterio entre la conexión de los extremos, o términos correlatos del sujeto, repito causas, efectos, adjuntos, circunstancias, contingencias; y después de ponderada aquella coincidencia y unión, dase una razón sutil, adecuada, que la satisfaga» (*Agudeza* 89). According to Gracián, there are two parts to this key form of *agudeza*: «la una es la ponderación, y la otra la razón que se da, y ésta es la principal» (*Agudeza* 89). Both Parker and Woods expand on May's interpretation of Gracián's *ponderación*, but Woods clearly marks a new path when he explains that «Gracian is using *ponderación* as synonymous with *encarecimiento*» («On Pondering» 642) and «that by *encarecimiento* Gracián means not wild over-statement but a justifiably heightened expression.» («On Pondering» 643).

underscoring the *concepto ingenioso*⁶ as an intimate encounter between artist and spectator. In this sacramental theater, the Ingenio is brought to life through the personification of that human faculty that, paradoxically, both creates and encounters novel correspondences, a combination that Paul Ricoeur would rediscover centuries later when considering the metaphor both «living» and «paradoxical.»⁷ Calderón, as we shall see, energizes early modern discussions and static images on wit and mental activity, and thus breathes new life into the *conceptismo* and *arte de ingenio* that form the very heart and soul of Spanish baroque art and thought.


Seventeenth-century writers and visual artists would give the mind's inventive faculty (wit) a prominent place in their aesthetic projects, as traditional rhetorical terms were revised and given nuanced senses under the category of *ingegno* in Italy and *ingenio* in Spain. Alexander Parker reminds us that this early seventeenth-century aesthetic shift toward wit was preceded by «the influence of Martial and the rise of the epigram» (xxxii), and that «the subject of Wit and its definition was widely discussed in Jesuit academic circles» (xxxiii). A case in point would be Casimir Sarbiewski's *De acuto et arguto sive Seneca et Martialis*, which uses a Pythagorean model for formulating wit, and is the result of a course on Martial that Sarbiewski delivered in 1626 or 1627 at the Jesuit Academy in Polotsk.⁸ Sarbiewski backs his definition of *acutum* and *argutum* on his exhaustive readings in Latin and Greek that sought to define these terms, and also on his serious discussions on the matter in Poland, Germany, France, and Italy: «An *acutum* is a saying in which something consistent is linked together with something inconsistent, in other words, a compatible incompatibility, or an incompatible compatibility.»⁹

⁶ Hidalgo-Serna defines this useful expression when he writes: «La dimensión filosófica del ingenio graciano se asienta sobre el concepto ingenioso, es decir, sobre el acto de percibir y constatar conexiones reales, y no correspondencias lógicas» (*Pensamiento* 69).

⁷ «Metaphor is living by virtue of the fact that it introduces the spark of imagination into a 'thinking more' at the conceptual level. This struggle to 'think more,' guided by the 'vivifying principle,' is the 'soul' of interpretation.» (303); Ricoeur recognizes the paradox that the «concept of imagination, in the context of a theory of metaphor centered around the notion of semantic innovation» is, at the same time, a «logic of discovery» (22).

⁸ Blanco, Woods (*Gracián*), and Pring-Mill have all looked at various aspects of Sarbiewski's notion of wit in terms of Gracián's work. Pring-Mill is certainly right in suggesting that «it does not seem beyond the bounds of possibility that Gracián may have heard of Sarbiewski's earlier lectures (given in Rome in 1623) through fellow Jesuits» (158).


⁹ «Acutum est oratio continens affinitatem dissentanei et consentanei, seu dicti concors discordia vel discors concordia» (10).



Unde potest avidus captae leo parcere praedae?
Sed tamen esse tuus dicitur: ergo potest².

Sarbiewski, *De acuto et arguto* (6).

TRIPLEX MODUS INVESTIGANDORUM ACUMINUM EX TRIPLICI LOCORUM COMPARATIONE



15 Comparatur vel res cum locis, vel duo loci eiusdem ordinis, vel duo loci diversi ordinis.

Sarbiewski, *De acuto et arguto* (14).



Frontispiece to Tesaurus's 1670 edition of *Il cannocchiale aristotelico*.

In this intellectual environment, Spanish Jesuit Baltasar Gracián's far-reaching *Arte de ingenio* of 1642—expanded in 1648 to *Agudeza y arte de ingenio*—built on these Jesuit discussions of the simultaneous production of concord and discord as the basis for wit, and he followed and expanded on Matteo Peregrini's *Delle Acutezze* of 1639 to put literary theory in direct contact with contemporary literature and real life experiences, mixing commentary with personal anecdotes. While Gracián refers extensively to Martial, his treatise gives clear preference to the modern literary production in Spain, Italy, and Portugal, with Luis de Góngora held as the exemplary poet of wit. Italian Jesuit Emanuele Tesauro's *Il cannocchiale aristotelico* represents another brilliant contribution to this aesthetic program begun by Peregrini and Gracián, but Tesauro, as his title suggests, reads metaphor theory through the prism of Aristotle; he does not relate his theory directly to contemporary life and literature in the way that Gracián does. Gracián's treatise is unique not only in its systematic ordering of wit and concepts, but also in its focus on early modernity and its intimate connection with his audience, and this is perhaps the most relevant dimension of his work for our analysis of Calderón's poetico-dramatic project.

In terms of visual imagery, Richard Dimler has demonstrated that «17th-century Jesuit emblem theory was influenced by the rise of rhetorical *innovatio*, by the use of the so-called *stylus argutus* or *concisus*, and by the attic movement which began in the 16th and continued into the 17th century» (209). By «attic movement,» Dimler is referring to the shift from the complex, oratorical style of Cicero to the concise, epigrammatic style of Seneca. Dimler points out that a highly visible group of Jesuit thinkers and emblematists, such as Athanasius Kircher or Claude-François Ménestrier, emphasized the concept of *ingenium* in the emblem. Illustrative in this regard is Peter Paul Rubens's allegory, created for the title page of Italian Jesuit Silvestro da Pietrasanta's *De symbolis heroicis*, in which, as Pietrasanta explains: «*Ingenium* receives from Art and Nature the material necessary for inscribing the 'heroic symbols'.»¹⁰ But this emblem theory was not restricted to the Jesuits, of course. Cesare Ripa, for example, in his monumental *Iconologia*, visualizes the *Ingegno* itself, offering the following verbal description: «*Ingegno* is that power of the spirit that makes man naturally quick and able to understand those branches of knowledge (*scienze*) to which he applies himself in will and in deed»; Ripa adds that the arrow, on the verge of being shot from the bow, shows the *Ingegno*'s «investigation and wit.»¹¹ Calderón, who received a

¹⁰ «*Ingenium*, hinc a Natura, hinc ab Arte materiam accipiens, ad scribenda Symbola Heroica» (576). Pietrasanta's explanation appears in the book's «Index Diversarum Iconum.»

¹¹ «*Ingegno* è quella potenza di spirito, che per natura rende l'homo pronto, e capace di tutte quelle scienze, ond'egli applica il volere, e l'opera... L'arco, e la frezza in atto di tirare, mostra l'investigazione, e l'acutezza» (239).



Title page to Pietrasanta's *De symbolis heroicis*.



con attenzione in atto di tirare.

Ingegno è quella potenza di spirito, che per natura rende l'homò pronto, e capace di tutte quelle scienze, ond'egli applica il volere, e l'opera. Gioiune si dipinge, per dimostrare, che la potenza intellettiua non inuechia mai.

Si rappresenta con la testa armata, & in vista fiero, & ardito, per dimostrare, il vigore, & la forza.

L'aquila per cimiero dinota la generosità, & sublimità sua; perciò che Pindaro paragona gli huomini di alto ingegno à questo ucello, hauendo egli la vista acutissima, & il volo di gran lunga superiore à gli altri animali volatili.

Si dipinge nudo e con l'ali di diuersi colori, per significare la sua velocità, prontezza nel suo discorso, & la varietà dell'inuentioni.

L'arco, e la frezza in atto di tirare, mostra l'inuestigazione, e l'acutezza.

Jesuit education in Madrid, turns these new textual and emblematic theories on *ingenium* into *tableaux vivants*, and this is the intellectual and aesthetic context necessary to read the playwright's weighty contribution to this tradition that blends the fields of literature and philosophy through the creative and cognitive processes of metaphor.

At an interdisciplinary symposium titled «Metaphor: The Conceptual Leap,» sponsored by the University of Chicago in 1978, Paul de Man presented his now renowned essay «The Epistemology of Metaphor,» which argues that figurative language itself is responsible for dissolving the fine line between literature and philosophy, and that «the relationship and the distinction between literature and philosophy cannot be made in terms of a distinction between aesthetic and epistemological categories» (28). At the same conference, Paul Ricoeur followed a similar line of thought in his paper titled «The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,» which makes the point that «there is a structural analogy between the cognitive, the imaginative, and the emotional components of the complete metaphorical act» (157). These questions which dig into the cognitive and epistemological elements of metaphor, questions which ground postmodern metaphor theory, are the same questions that root the pre-Enlightenment *arte de ingenio* of Gracián and Calderón, whose texts display the inner workings of the mind and the human cognitive faculty in thought, word, and action through concept, wit, and metaphor. In a solid reassessment of Gracián's thought, Emilio Hidalgo-Serna highlights «la triple 'fuerza' (agudeza) del ingenio humano»:

- el arte cognoscitivo-filosófico del pensamiento ingenioso y la función lógica del concepto («agudeza de concepto»);
- la agudeza estético-literaria («agudeza verbal»); y
- la aplicación práctico-moral del ingenio («agudeza de acción»), que constituye el centro de gravitación de su filosofía moral. (*Pensamiento* 5)

While Gracián has been recovered within the philosophical tradition of postmodernity, literary and philosophical studies seem to have short-shrifted the question of Calderón's *pensamiento ingenioso*, particularly as exemplified in his *autos sacramentales*, where we see early modern metaphor theory played out through the personifications of Ingenio, Pensamiento, Entendimiento, as well as Duda, Naturaleza Humana, and other similar extensions of the human condition performing their duties of creation and interpretation on the critical stages of life.¹²

¹² Hidalgo-Serna is quick to dismiss Calderón's sacramental allegories from the Humastic program of Vives, Gracián, and Vico: «La incoherencia calderoniana radica en querer significar en un lenguaje metafórico común, no sólo el ser del mundo histórico, sino también el ente religioso y teológico. Si la teología

As a point of departure for a meaningful analysis of Calderón's stage mechanics of the mind, we must look into the dramatic relationship between the personifications of Ingenio and Pensamiento in Calderón's autos, clearly distinguishing between the human faculties of *ingenio* and *entendimiento*. Calderón dramatizes the rhetorical relationship between *ingenium* and *iudicium* that had been theorized in the sixteenth century, but Calderón is in line with Gracián's program, which is quite different from that of the Humanists of the previous century. This point is lost on Curtius, who does not distinguish between Valdés and Gracián in this regard (Curtius 297), but it is not lost on Maldonado de Guevara, who cracked the code of the Cervantine sense of «ingenioso hidalgo» by tracing it back to the characterology that underscored the Humanistic psychology of Huarte de San Juan's *Examen de ingenios*.¹³ Nor is the point lost on Pozuelo Yvancos, who astutely hits the mark when he writes: «Cuando Gracián habla de juicio y de ingenio, piensa en algo diferente a lo que pensaba por ejemplo Juan de Valdés, quien en su *Diálogo de la Lengua*, escribía: 'El ingenio halla qué dezir, y el juicio escoge lo mejor de lo que el ingenio halla y pónelo en el lugar que ha de estar, de manera que de las dos partes del orador, que son invención y disposición (que quiere dezir ordenación), la primera se puede atribuir al ingenio y la segunda al juicio'» (134). While Calderón is in line with Gracián's break from the sixteenth-century rigidities regarding the proper place of *ingenium* and *iudicium*, the playwright brings that new relationship to life by creating contemporary personifications of these human extensions who interact with one another in Madrid's public square, not only as visualizations of the human thought process, but as the thought process of his very spectators in the act of thinking about the Eucharistic dimensions of his play while watching. In *Amar y ser amado y Divina Filotea*, the figure of Entendimiento directs the following

y la ontología constituyen la afirmación de una *religatio* no ligada al tiempo y al espacio histórico, después de ser abstraída y olvidada la materia, el ente quedará desligado del *verbum* originario y del *sermo* propio que pueden significar el ser singular y sus nuevas circunstancias. En el auto sacramental la metáfora pierde la fuerza iluminante y filosófica para asumir la función escolástica de servir a la ilustración del mundo religioso. Del escenario sacro desaparece la correlación histórica del *verbum* con la *res*, no hay más que la llamada de la necesidad y la argumentación viene impuesta y resuelta apriorísticamente por la teología sin la intervención del hombre» («Vives» 82).

¹³ For more on Cervantes's debt to Huarte de San Juan, see Salillas. On the other hand, Hidalgo-Serna points out that, for Vives, «*ingenia* are examined both for their subject matter and for their modes of action' (*spectantur rursus ingenia in materia atque actione*)» («*Ingenium*» 234), and that Huarte's «misreading» of Vives's *ingenium* is significant: «If we confuse the mode of action of *ingenium* with its subject matter, we lose the meaning of the faculty of *ingenium* as a creative, inventive, cognitive, and practical mode of action. An example of such a[n] error appears in Huarte's *Examen de ingenios* (1575), a work that without Vives' *De tradendis disciplinis* (1531) is impossible to understand. In the subtitle of Juan Huarte de San Juan, *Examen de ingenios para las ciencias. Donde se muestra la diferencia de habilidades que ay en los hombres y el genero de letras que a cada uno responde en particular* (Baeza, 1575), the full disregard of *ingenium*'s manner of operating strikes us» («*Ingenium*» 240n 32).

words to Ingenio, clearly influenced by the aforementioned distinction between *ingenium* and *iudicium*:

nos apartaron los genios,
tú a inventar y yo a elegir;
a cuya causa nos dieron
de Entendimiento a mí el nombre,
como a ti el nombre de Ingenio. (1783)

Nevertheless, the function of the Ingenio is not always limited to the act of inventing; in fact, at times, it adopts the act of selecting, previously considered the terrain of understanding. Gracián pointed out this flexibility in his treatise: «Es de notar, que unas veces discurre el ingenio por invención; otras, por elección, así que no siempre inventa» (*Agudeza* II; 228). It is precisely this duality of the discourse of *ingenio* that grounds the mutable nature of this personification, and which makes him such a compelling «actor» in the complex and ever-changing drama of human existence.

The figure of Pensamiento also has a twofold role which vacillates between the imagination and the act of thinking proper, and at times he seems to erase the distinction between one and the other. Pensamiento tends to appear as the *gracioso*, and he is even portrayed as a *loco*, unable to be controlled by reason.¹⁴ In the auto *El día mayor de los días*, the figure of Ingenio directs the following lines to his own Pensamiento, who on this occasion is fused with the notion of free or unrestrained imagination:

Ya sé que eres loco y no
loco de atar, pues no hay cuerda
imaginación que tú
no rompas. (1637)

Such oppositional forces between the intellect and the wild imagination of the human psyche almost anticipate the Romantic spirit that led to Goya's famous

¹⁴ In chapter 4 («El vicio de la lujuria») of his *Tratado de la victoria de sí mismo*, Melchor Cano describes this very same nature of *pensamiento* that Calderón would personify in his theater a century later. Cano explains that lust begins in the senses and, if this pleasure (*deleite*) is not nipped in the bud in this first stage (i.e., the external senses), it will continue on to the second stage, «que algunos llaman cogitativa, otros imaginativa, do se anidan las malas representaciones, en las cuales el pensamiento, detenido con deleitarse en lo que piensa, tiene por nombre en las escuelas cogitación morose... El segundo grado es en la cogitativa, cuando la voluntad casi de propósito disimula y deja el pensamiento torpe perseverar con su deleite, en que peligran a las veces las mujeres viudas, por la memoria de las obras pasadas con sus maridos» (307).

etching *El sueño de la razón produce monstruos*. Through these two characters, Ingenio and Pensamiento, Calderón achieves the same dynamic relationship between galán and criado that makes up the staging practices of the *comedia*, thus opening the vital space for the essence of the philosophical question, which is dialogue, conversation, theater as inner reflection. And it is worth recalling that Cervantes sends Don Quijote back to his village after an initial sally, to find in Sancho, not only a servant, but perhaps more important, a worthy interlocutor for the numerous conversations that would also render the Don «ingenioso.»

In *Obrar bien que Dios es Dios*, an existential play staged within the auto *El gran teatro del mundo*, the entire action is reduced precisely to the experiment or test of charity of each character, and to the conversation between the characters, an action suggested by the King to lessen the burden of the common path of the actors:

Supuesto que es esta vida
una representación,
y que vamos un camino
todos juntos, haga hoy
del camino la llaneza,
común la conversación. (214)

After the death of each character, the spontaneous company does not know what to do, since there is of course no libretto in the theater of life. El Rico insists time and again that what they must do is: «Volver / a nuestra conversación» (215, 216, 217). In this metarepresentation, conversation is staged as imagination and improvisation, acts that shape the thought visualized here through the allegorical dialogue in the drama of human life. Almost prefiguring Heidegger's view that «only when man speaks, does he think—not the other way around» (16), Calderón creates a dialogic arena that opens a space for the interior monologues and streams of consciousness that both are, and lead to, the act of «thinking.»¹⁵

¹⁵ Hidalgo-Serna underscores Vives's «essential connection between *ingenium* and speech. In both *De Disciplinis* and *De ratione dicendi*, Vives starts from an unchanging assumption: 'All human societies are mastered and held together by two things in particular: justice and speech' (*humanae omnes societates duabus potissimum rebus vincuntur ac continentur, justitia et sermone*)» («*Ingenium*» 235). Calderón inherits Vives's focus on the interrelatedness of *ingenium* and *sermo* (speech, conversation), and this connection finds its way into Heidegger's ontological program. In all three thinkers, there is an intimate link between human thought/existence and the social sharing of conversation. Gracián mirrors this idea: «Es el hablar efecto grande de la racionalidad, que quien no discurre no conversa. ... De suerte que es la noble conversación hija del discurso, madre del saber, desahogo del alma, comercio de los coraçones, vínculo de la amistad, pasto del contento y ocupación de personas» (*Crítico*n 68-69).

When performing together on the boards of these allegorical pieces, in this «great theater of the world,» Ingenio and Pensamiento execute emblematically, in flesh and blood, the Calderonian conception of thinking as the method or path to knowledge. The staging of their actions prepares the ground for modern ideas that consider thought an action or reaction that is brought about as a result of our awareness of our circumstance in a world full of uncertainties, what José Ortega y Gasset called «saber a qué atenerse.» Resuscitating the etymological sense of the word «drama,» from the Greek *drao* (to do or act), Ortega defines thought thus: «Pensamiento es cuanto hacemos—sea ello lo que sea— para salir de la duda en que hemos caído y llegar de nuevo a estar en lo cierto» (530). Doubt as a foundation for modern thought led Descartes to his famous *cogito*, and Calderón, although toward quite different goals, is fond of subjecting his characters to a quest for certainty through *monodiálogos* with his own conscience. In various *autos*, Calderón identifies the reason for doubt with the personification of Ingenio, and this methodic doubt is understood as the first step toward knowledge through dialogue or conversation with the personification of Pensamiento.

In spite of the clichés that have pigeonholed Calderón as a logico-rational scholastic, the playwright stages the act of thinking as a challenge that transcends all logic and rationalism, an epistemological doctrine that our poet associates more with the Protestants in the North. Exemplary in this regard is the aforementioned auto *El día mayor de los días*, whose plot emerges from the doubt that, like thought itself, takes the form of an inner struggle that is externalized through dialogue or conversation. The play opens with the personification of the Ingenio, a pre-Christian Greek philosopher, reading a passage from the Gospel of John (12.24-25) in Calderón's translation from the Latin: «Si el grano / no muere, que cae en la Tierra... / [...] / Si no / se corrompe, solo él queda» (1636). The character suspends judgment, confused between this written text and the hymns sung by the personification of Music: «Día de todos los Días / contiene edades eternas» (1636). Ingenio finds himself in a state of confusion or doubt between the written word and the living word, and this quest for certainty leads him to his own Pensamiento. Ingenio comprehends the scholastic-Aristotelian deductive categories of the written text («ser la corrupción de uno / generación de otro»), an Aristotelian question of corruption and generation that Juan de Santo Tomás had also tackled in his *Naturalis Philosophia tertia pars* of 1633,¹⁶ but the character ignores the spiritual or «mystical» sense that reveals that, through his death, Christ makes himself accessible to all. In a word, this philosophical character confronts the challenge of abandoning rational thought and undertaking a type of thought that is *ingenioso*, allegorical, and syncretic, and which is, of course, that of Calderón.

¹⁶ Arellano and Zugasti date Calderón's *auto* to 1678 (7).

Ingenio asks to be left alone to reflect on these texts, but he suddenly undergoes a change of heart, fearful of that solitary inner struggle that is rational and individualist thought, the antithesis of the conversation that symbolizes the community spirit of Catholic life:

Dejadme solo; mas no,
que al que desvelado piensa
dejarle solo, es dejarle
a batallar con sus penas. (1637)

He immediately reconsiders that the «company» that Music gives him (as the chorus of faith), can help him in his synthetic exegesis between the two laws; that is, Music, as the Tradition of the Church, can serve him as the ultimate decoder of texts, although the Ingenio still does not recognize his own words and actions in such Tridentine terms. What he does recognize is his ability to seek out and create correspondences among seemingly disparate elements, precisely the underlying notion of Gracián's *arte de ingenio*:¹⁷

Dejadme solo; mas no
tan solo que hacer no pueda
deste libro y de este canto
paridad a entrambas letras. (1637)

Calderón underscores the dialectic or «monodialogic» process that grounds all thought or doubt; a bit later, Ingenio alludes to his doubt thus: «¿quién puede / vencer esta interior lid?» (1652). The solitude of thought-doubt leads him nowhere, and therefore the personification of Pensamiento appears in this and various allegorical plays to dramatize the dialogue that represents the path to knowledge. Ingenio confesses that, on his own, «no puede hallar el Ingenio / convención a tan opuestas razones,» and he listens to his own logico-rational limitations expressed by his own Pensamiento, a *gracioso* who mocks the rational and individualist process that attempts to understand that which transcends the limits of reason: «no pienses / penetrar lo que piensas» (1637).

Human thought cannot reach a synthetic exegesis of texts that the Ingenio attempts to comprehend rationally, since the message of Christ crucified is a «stumbling block» and «foolishness» for non-Christian beliefs and philosophies, but for those «called to Christ,» it is the true «wisdom of God» (1 Corinthians 1.23-24). Calderón allegorizes in his *gracioso* Pensamiento, and also in many secular plays,

¹⁷ Hidalgo-Serna notes this critical element of comparison in Vives's concept of *ingenium* («*Ingenium*» 232-33).

the same idea that Gracián expressed in his *Oráculo manual*: «Hace concepto el sabio de todo, aunque con distinción cava donde hay fondo y reparo, y piensa, tal vez, que hay más de lo que piensa; de suerte que llega la reflexión adonde [no] llegó la aprehensión» (*Oráculo* 154). Both writers create in their characters and in their respective audiences that allegorical reflection where the light of reason falls short. The difference is that, for the playwright, at least in his *autos*, the concept that is created must always be grounded in faith, since not even the Ingenio is able to fathom the mysterious depths of God.¹⁸

The *convención* or accord that Ingenio seeks is what Gracián calls «artificio conceptuoso», which consists of «una primorosa concordancia, en una armónica correlación entre dos o tres cognoscibles extremos, expresada por un acto del entendimiento» (*Agudeza* I; 55). Precisely this process of correlating the «knowable extremes», although still unknown by the personification of the Ingenio, will shape our interpretation of the allegorical action of the *auto*, which the introspective protagonist signals to us. From our «reading» of the piece, then, the Ingenio is the personification of our own cognitive faculty, while he represents, at the same time, Calderón's creative faculty. The two *ingenios*, that of the audience and that of the artist, meet in the representational space of the allegorical concept in which God is revealed in «the theaters of time», where man comes to know the Eternal, and himself. Friedrich Nietzsche remarked on this same common space, in terms of the ancient Greek chorus, calling it the «dramatic protophenomenon: to see oneself transformed before one's own eyes and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, another character» (64). Hans-Georg Gadamer would put this into even more provocative terms by calling this phenomenon the «communion» between the stage and the spectator (101-34). It is in this sense that Calderón rips contemporary theories on wit and thought from the page to give them life as the hermeneutical doppelgänger of both artist and audience.

Calderón plays with the very search for allegories (or correlations) for the *autos sacramentales* that celebrate the Feast of Corpus Christi, making the Ingenio ask how it is possible that he has not had «noticia de tales señas / hasta ahora» (1637). His Pensamiento responds with a witty self-awareness of his festivo-dramatic circumstance: «como cada año / por este tiempo te empleas / en buscar alegorías, / hasta este no caíste en esta» (1637). In *El héroe*, Gracián writes: «es el ingenio esfera de la agudeza» (*Héroe* 12), a sphere that corresponds exactly to the search for allegories, as explained by Pensamiento in Calderón's *auto*. The art of seeking concepts or allegories is the «agudeza de ingenio», which Gracián calls «la valentía

¹⁸ For a discussion of Calderón's personification of Fe as an interlocutor with human thought, see Martin, chapter 6 («No hay instante sin milagro») (152-83).